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“Deliverology” and Evaluation: A Tale of Two Worlds 

Lisa Birch and  Steve Jacob 
 Université Laval 
Abstract: In recent years, the new political governance, a partisan model that con­
tributes to a permanent campaign, gained ground in public organizations. In this
new context, “deliverology” is portrayed as an innovative method to help govern­
ments implement new policies and deliver on election promises. This article presents 
the similarities and diff erences that exist between “deliverology” and evaluation. Is
deliverology really something new or is it another case of old wine in a new bottle? 
Is deliverology a substitute for or, instead, a complement to institutionalized evalu­
ation? To what extent does new political governance (exemplified by deliverology
and performance measurement) undermine evidence-based decision making? What
is the value-added of deliverology? These questions are addressed through a critical 
reflection on deliverology and its value-added in Canada, where evaluation became
institutionalized in many departments and agencies under the influence of results-
based management, promoted by the advocates of new public management over
four decades. 
Keywords: deliverology, election promises, evaluation, new political governance, 
results-based management 
Résumé : Depuis quelques années, la nouvelle gouvernance politique, un modèle de 
gestion partisane qui contribue à une campagne permanente, gagne en faveur dans 
les organisations publiques. Dans ce nouveau contexte, la « résultologie » est présen­
tée comme une méthode innovatrice de mise en œuvre des politiques gouvernemen­
tales et de suivi de la réalisation des promesses électorales. Cet article présente les 
points communs et les différences qui existent entre la résultologie et l’évaluation. 
La résultologie est-elle vraiment quelque chose de nouveau ou est-ce seulement
une autre manière de réinventer la roue? La résultologie est-elle un substitut ou 
plutôt un complément à l’évaluation qui s’est progressivement institutionnalisée dans
l’appareil d’État? Dans quelle mesure la nouvelle gouvernance politique (incarnée
par la résultologie et la gestion du rendement) vient-elle miner la prise de décisions 
éclairées par des données probantes? Quelle est la valeur ajoutée de la résultologie? 
Pour répondre à ces questions, le présent article propose une réflexion critique sur 
la résultologie et sa valeur ajoutée au Canada, où l’évaluation s’est institutionnalisée
dans les ministères et les agences sous l’influence de la tendance de gestion axée sur 
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304 Birch and Jacob 
les résultats, dont les partisans de la nouvelle gestion publique font la promotion 
depuis quelque 40 ans.
Mots clé  : résultologie, promesses électorales, évaluation, nouvelle gouvernance 
politique, gestion axée sur les résultats  
 Throughout his latest book, entitled “ What is Government Good at?: A Canadian 
Answer,” Donald Savoie (2015), a well-known Canadian political scientist, is high­
ly critical of the inverted 90 percent–10 percent culture1 with a strong, structural 
fault line between ideas and implementation that has arisen with the advent of 
the permanent election campaign. He argues that 90% of policy resources should 
be dedicated to implementation and only 10% to ideas. The current inversion of 
these proportions has accentuated executive-level centralization and partisan
dynamics in Canadian public administration in the context of an increasingly 
complex, globalized policy environment with rising pressures for higher transpar­
ency standards and ever more demanding media scrutiny. Chouinard and Milley 
(2015 ) raise concerns about how this twenty-first-century trend, coined the “new 
political governance” by Aucoin (2012 ), undermines the evaluation function and 
evidence-based approaches in policy formulation, generating two paradoxes: (1) 
the paradox of use, which shifts the focus toward symbolic utilization for technical 
tracking, as opposed to policy learning and social betterment; and (2) the paradox 
of accountability, which redirects attention toward democratic accountability and 
away from accountability for public management, leading to the politicization of
public administration and an erosion of public-sector norms of neutrality, inde­
pendence, and professionalism. 
In How to Run a Government so that Citizens Benefit and Taxpayers Don’t Go 
Crazy, Sir Michael Barber (2016), the founder of “deliverology,” criticizes what 
he calls “government by spasm,” which is caught up in present-focused crisis 
management, producing sound bites and announcements in anticipation of and 
reaction to “noise” from the conventional and social media agendas. He advocates 
instead for “government by routines,” which is focused on managing and driving 
its own delivery agenda, with regular reporting on progress and success stories to 
the media and the public. 
Recourse to Barber’s “deliverology” as a tool for new political governance began
with the Tony Blair government in the United Kingdom (1997–2007) and spread
to Canada through the Dalton McGuinty government (Ontario, 2003–13) and now
the Justin Trudeau government (Canada, 2015–present). However, there is a dearth
of evidence on deliverology’s effectiveness as a “way to run a government” and little
analysis of how it is differentiated from results- or performance-based management
or from concomitant evaluation or monitoring (Richards, 2018; Richards, Gallo, &
Kronick, 2017; Schacter, 2016). In the Canadian context, where the state progres­
sively institutionalized evaluation and results-based approaches over four decades,
one may wonder about the “value-added” of Barber’s deliverology and, as Schacter
(2016 ) puts it, what problem deliverology is purporting to solve.
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“Deliverology” and Evaluation 305 
Although Savoie (2015) and Barber (2016) share a similar diagnosis of
modern governance challenges and the need to focus on implementation (see 
note 1), they do not reference each other’s work or even the same literature on
governance. Furthermore, where Savoie criticizes new political governance and 
private-sector–style performance management as harmful for implementation
and service delivery in the public sector, deliverology embraces both the govern­
ing party’s reform agenda and private-sector–inspired performance management
for optimal delivery, thereby becoming a tool for new political governance. Th ese 
observations inspire the image of two worlds, each with its own referential frame 
and its own conclusions, which share a vision that government should realign 
to deliver whatever it is good at doing for the greater good of citizens. Th e small 
overlap between the two worlds remains a concern for improved decision making 
regarding policy implementation and for better policy outcomes. One domain 
is the “deliverologist’s” world and the other is the world of the evaluators, public 
administration scholars, and political scientists. 
 Through an overview of central ideas and criticisms of Barber’s deliverology, 
we situate deliverology relative to  ex ante, concomitant, and  ex post evaluation as
well as results-based management. We then explore the controversial implemen­
tation of deliverology in Canada. Despite their common concerns for improved 
policy implementation, deliverology and evaluation appear largely as two worlds 
with different roots and evidence standards and with some overlapping zones, 
notably the use of performance indicators in evaluation and the aspiration for 
social betterment through effective policy delivery and meaningful public-sector 
reform. However, there are vast zones where these worlds diverge discursively, 
methodologically, and philosophically. 
WHAT IS BARBER’S DELIVEROLOGY?
Deliverology is a trademark created and owned by Delivery Associates, Michael 
Barber’s consultancy firm (Delivery Associates, n.d.a). Although Barber initially 
spoke of an emerging science of delivery, Delivery Associates market it as follows: 
Deliverology® is our system for helping governments deliver meaningful results that 
will last. It is both a science and an art. The science is the routine of setting a target and 
then using data, technology, planning, monitoring and problem solving to achieve it. 
The art is the way you do it and how you behave—it needs focus, urgency, ambition, 
honesty and humility. (Delivery Associates, n.d.b) 
Deliverology is a global business that promotes a model of how to run a govern­
ment drawn from business management and its founder’s practical experience in 
education and advising governments on delivering reforms. Barber relentlessly 
transformed his original practitioner experience acquired in the Blair years as 
head of the Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit into a tool for global career mobility 
through partnerships and networks involving high-profile management consult­
ant firms such as McKinsey & Company with the McKinsey Global Institute, and 
doi: 10.3138/cjpe.53365 CJPE 34.2, 303–328 © 2019 
  
 
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
          
          
 
 
  
  
   
 
 
  
        
  
  
  
  
306 Birch and Jacob 
the Boston Consulting Group with its Centre for Public Impact (Brown, 2015; 
see also Centre for Public Impact, 2016, 2017, n.d.), and now his own Delivery 
Associates. This network includes international organizations like the OECD, the 
World Bank, the World Economic Forum (see Global Agenda Council on Edu­
cation, 2016, for an example), and non-profit or philanthropic think tanks such
as the Centre for American Progress and the Brookings Institute, as well as Th e 
Economist Intelligence Unit, the Institute for Public Policy Research, the Institute 
for Government, the Social Market Foundation, and NESTA, all in the United 
Kingdom. Deliverology is thus an example of a business in the lucrative, public-
sector management reforms industry (see Manning, 2015, about this industry, and 
Manning & Watkins, 2013, for a comparison of deliverology to other approaches). 
 The main sources of inspiration for Barber’s model of delivery, as shown by
his bibliographies, span an eclectic mix, including (1) his own experiences as re­
counted in his publications, (2) historical accounts of country success, fi xing fail­
ures, and trends in Western history, with works by Fukuyama, (3) biographies or
autobiographies of leaders such as Winston Churchill, Theodore Roosevelt, Mar­
garet Thatcher, and Tony Blair, (4) various publications by governments, consul­
tancy groups, think tanks, and international organizations, (5) popular literature 
on great or successful companies, (6) accounts of delivery-unit successes in other 
countries such as Chile and Malaysia, and (7) books on public and private strate­
gies (see reference lists in Barber, 2008, 2013, 2016, 2017; Barber, Donnelly, & 
Rizvi, 2013; Barber, Moffit, & Kihn, 2011a, 2011b). The preference for grey lit­
erature as opposed to peer-reviewed academic publications is summarized in the
following statement: 
synthesis is now provided by organisations outside universities—thinktanks, public 
agencies or consultancies, or by those who translate the synthesis into action…. [T]he 
most influential reports globally in the past five years have come from the Organisa­
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), McKinsey or, recently, 
the Economist Intelligence Unit. (Barber et al., 2013, p. 17) 
 The academic literature in evaluation, public administration,2 and political sci­
ence is remarkably absent from Barber’s reference lists. Conversely, references 
to “deliverology”  per se are rare in evaluation and policy studies, where there is a 
vast literature grounded in scientific inquiry and practitioners’ experiences aft er 
four decades of institutionalization and professionalization of evaluation in Ca­
nadian public administration (Canada, Treasury Board Secretariat, 2013–2014; 
Cummings & Gauthier, 2016; Dobell & Zussman, 2018; Jacob, 2006). Th us, the 
first divergence between evaluation and deliverology is rooted in their respective
sources of knowledge and inspiration. 
DIVERGENT EVIDENCE STANDARDS
Flowing from this divergence is another one concerning evidence standards
for policymakers. At first glance, deliverology seems at odds with discourses
© 2019 CJPE 34.2, 303–328 doi: 10.3138/cjpe.53365 
  
    
  
 
  
 
    
  
 
    
   
 
  
   
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
     
 
“Deliverology” and Evaluation 307 
on bringing scientific evidence back into policy. However, Cairney and Oliver
(2017 ) remind us that scientists compete with other influential actors to access
policymaking audiences. They argue that these audiences face two challenges. 
First, policymakers operate in complex, power-sharing, multi-level governance 
environments. Second, given this complexity and its inherent ambiguities, policy-
makers act under conditions of bounded rationality and thus accept variations in 
evidence standards and hierarchies. Policymaking audiences can opt for evidence 
from implementation science, with its emphasis on gathering data on eff ective­
ness, with attentiveness to evidence hierarchies that value systematic reviews and 
randomized controlled trials (RCTs), on scaling up best practices through replica­
tion, and on managing dosages of the “active ingredient” for change. They can also
include other social science research as well as internal and external evaluations 
of policies and their implementation and outcomes (Cantelli, Jacob, Genard, & de 
Visscher, 2006; Nilsen, Ståhl, Roback, & Cairney, 2013 ). They can choose evidence
presented through storytelling approaches about indicators of eff ectiveness from
practitioners and service users, narrations of experiences in case studies, and de­
scriptions of key principles to be prioritized for service delivery (for an example,
see Results and Delivery—Lessons From Around the World. Canada School of Pub­
lic Service, 2016a; see also Delivery Associates, n.d.b). In Canada, at the outset of 
his first mandate, Justin Trudeau, as Prime Minister of Canada, turned to Barber 
with his storytelling approach and more supple evidence hierarchy (see Dobell & 
Zussman, 2018; Puttick & Ludlow, 2013; Shepherd, 2018) instead of contracting 
to experts in public policy and public administration for guidance in implement­
ing, rather than delivering, the Liberal Party of Canada’s platform. It is important 
to note that, for Barber, evidence that a policy is working lies in achieving a set of
chosen targets set by the executive level of government, whereas for evaluators and 
scholars, the aspirational standards are set in light of the policy goals and require 
the production of valid and reliable data using scientific methods to determine the 
policy’s relevance, eff ectiveness, efficiency, impact, and sustainability in achieving 
positive intended outcomes. 
IS DELIVEROLOGY A MODEL OF POLICY CHANGE OR
OF PLEDGE FULFILLMENT?
Let us now turn to the core elements of deliverology as a model of policy change 
and implementation and as a tool for reforming public-sector management. Th is 
model tells policymakers at the top to begin by answering five simple questions: 
(1) What are you trying to do? (2) How are you trying to do it? (3) How, at any 
given moment, will you know that you are on track? (4) If you are not on track, 
what are you going to do about it?, and (5) How can we help?, and to establish 
a routinized system requiring civil servants to report upwards on these same 
questions (Barber, 2008; Canada School of Public Service, 2016a; Murekeyisoni, 
2017 ). The governing party answers these questions in reference to its election 
platform, giving a partisan orientation to the policy goals, programs, and reforms 
doi: 10.3138/cjpe.53365 CJPE 34.2, 303–328 © 2019 
  
  
 
  
  
 
      
 
  
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
   
  
 
   
           
 
308 Birch and Jacob 
to be implemented by civil servants. The implicit, normative assumption is that
the governing party’s policy choices and reforms are inherently correct and fully 
legitimate, thus potentially precluding  ex ante assessments of their relevance, logic 
models, and evidence base. 
For the next step in implementation, Barber advises politicians that they
must achieve the four components of deliverology in order as follows: (1) de­
velop a foundation for delivery, (2) understand the delivery challenge, (3) plan 
for delivery, and (4) drive delivery (Barber et al., 2011a, p. 237). Th e fi rst step 
involves reviewing the current state of delivery and creating a specialized results 
and delivery unit at the apex of power that leads delivery. Located deep inside the 
executive level of government, the delivery unit is far above Savoie’s (2015) fault 
line in the current 90% range dedicated to policy ideas and communications. 
Although it does not invert the problematic “90/10” split, it does bring a strong
mandate to pursue implementation relentlessly down the delivery chain to pro­
duce, monitor, and report on meaningful outcomes using metrics that citizens 
can see and understand (Barber, 2016; Barber et al., 2011a, 2011b ; Murekeyisoni, 
2017 ). This specialized delivery unit is to lead the way to cultural change in gov­
ernment and throughout delivery chains such that the institutional buzzwords 
become “ambition, focus, clarity, urgency and irreversibility” (Barber et al., 2011a; 
see pp. 31–33). 
 The second step requires an assessment of past and present performance as 
well as the drivers of performance. Next, the government must proceed to estab­
lish a delivery plan comprising three key components: (1) the reform strategy, 
(2) the delivery chains, and (3) the targets and trajectories. The metrics must be 
clear, measurable, and meaningful to citizens and, especially, to politicians to help 
them “run a government” and usher in change efficiently. Finally, it is necessary to
drive delivery by establishing routines for performance monitoring and problem-
solving, and by maintaining the momentum. Thus, deliverology seems to address 
the bounded rationality problem of policymakers by proposing a simple plan: the 
relentless pursuit of a set of clear goals with the prioritization and tracking of key 
metrics and the delivery capacity to act quickly when needed. 
Barber presented deliverology to the Canadian cabinet as a four-year pledge-
fulfillment strategy: “Set the agenda and develop the approach” and “show early 
wins” (year 1), “establish the delivery discipline across government” and “drive for 
results” (year 2), “continue drive for results” and “plan delivery of the next parlia­
ment’s top priorities” (year 3), and “manage through to success and run-up to
the election” (year 4) (see Barber, 2016; Canada School of Public Service, 2016a ). 
Journalists, commentators, and some academics tend to perceive deliverology as a 
pledge-fulfillment tool that helps the government to achieve measurable, concrete
outcomes that respect election promises and keeps them accountable to citizens 
while improving governance through continuous monitoring of implementation
(Arellano, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c; Castonguay, 2016;  Lahey, 2017;  Murekeyisoni , 
2017; Wells, 2016a; Wherry, 2016, 2017; Zilio, 2016). Ironically, despite Barber’s 
critique of short-term thinking and government by political communication,
© 2019 CJPE 34.2, 303–328 doi: 10.3138/cjpe.53365 
  
 
  
  
  
   
    
 
  
   
 
 
  
 
   
 
 
       
 
 
 
  
“Deliverology” and Evaluation 309 
deliverology promotes a management and communication strategy that fi ts with
the electoral logic of the permanent campaign in representative democracy, where 
governing parties are always preparing for, recovering from, and engaging in elec­
tions (Couture & Jacob, 2019). 
 By defining the election promises as the deliverables and planning for their 
delivery over the electoral cycle, deliverology implicitly embraces the traditional 
model of electoral or democratic accountability known as promissory representa­
tion, whereby citizens grant a mandate to a political party to govern and hold the 
government accountable to keeping its election promises (Mansbridge, 2003). Re­
search shows that, deliverology or not, the promise-keeping records at the federal 
level in Canada and provincially in Quebec are quite good (Pétry, 2014; Pétry & 
Birch, 2016, 2018; Pétry & Duval, 2015). The governing party seeks to satisfy voter 
preferences expressed by the election results. Recent work examining the per­
formance of the Couillard government in Quebec (2014–2018) and the Trudeau 
government (2015–present) shows that while pledge fulfi llment is an important
aspect of governance between elections, much legislative and policy action is not 
linked directly to election promises but rather to agenda-setting dynamics for 
new issues and policy-cycle dynamics for existing policies and programs (Jacob,
Birch, Pétry, & Baby-Bouchard, 2018; Birch, Jacob & Baby-Bouchard, 2019).
Furthermore, in a pioneering study, Werner (2018 ) discovered that when given 
a choice between democratic representation models, fewer than one in ten re­
spondents preferred promissory representation through faithful promise keeping,
while half chose the trustee or anticipatory model of governing for the common 
good (see also Mansbridge, 2003, for a discussion of all representation models). 
Without a mutually exclusive choice between models (i.e., with separate questions 
about each model), respondents gave each representation model high importance 
rankings. Werner concludes that voters “want it all”—governing parties that are 
promise keepers and trustees of the common good and that show responsiveness 
to public opinion. In light of these findings regarding democratic accountability, 
it is necessary to ask what the value-added of deliverology is, as a way to imple­
ment election promises deemed to be of inherent worth, when governments are 
already quite good at promise keeping and when citizens may expect more than 
promise keeping. 
HOW DOES DELIVEROLOGY COMPARE TO
EVALUATION AND RESULTS-BASED MANAGEMENT?
On the surface, deliverology seems to include a form of monitoring or concomi­
tant evaluation (as opposed to ex ante or ex post evaluation), with its emphasis on
tracking and targeting key metrics. These metrics are similar to results-based tar­
gets in public-sector management. Tweedie (2018 ), a policy developer and strate­
gist in the government of Canada, argues that deliverology is really a rebranding 
of results-based management. Deliverology supports recourse to dashboards,
but with a small set of specific targets deemed to be meaningful for citizens.
doi: 10.3138/cjpe.53365 CJPE 34.2, 303–328 © 2019 
  
   
 
   
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
      
 
 
   
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
      
  
310 Birch and Jacob 
Both evaluation and deliverology share an ambition to ensure social betterment 
through the development, design, and implementation of effective policies and 
programs that yield meaningful outcomes. However, deliverology focuses on im­
plementing the governing party’s vision of betterment via a delivery unit, while 
the multiple evaluation units dispersed throughout government agencies question
the coherence between policy aims, implementation, and outcomes, their appro­
priateness, and the soundness of underlying logic models. As Table 1 shows, there 
are many substantive distinctions between the two worlds. Additional diff erences 
concern the vocabulary and scope of modern theory-based evaluations that at­
tend to both the intended and unintended outcomes, using a variety of qualitative 
and quantitiative data sources rather than a shortlist of key metrics.
WHAT ARE THE CRITICISMS OF DELIVEROLOGY AND
ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR EVALUATION AND EVIDENCE­
INFORMED POLICYMAKING?
Positive perspectives on deliverology start from Barber’s claims that it enhances 
public-sector management, performance, and accountability to better serve citi­
zens, regardless of the conditions at the outset of adopting deliverology. Barber 
(2016 ) and Castonguay (2016 ) suggest that deliverology can alleviate taxpayer 
dissatisfaction and improve confidence in government. However, most of these
claims are prospective opinions that have not been verified empirically through a 
rigourous independent evaluation process.3 Robert Lahey (2017, p. 7), a Canadian
evaluation expert and practitioner turned consultant, who was the founding head 
of Canada’s Centre of Excellence for Evaluation, noted, “On the positive side, 
deliverology, given its link to political power, generally brings with it authority,
resources, flexibility and a striving for provision of timely advice and quick turna­
round (i.e. a sense of urgency that can potentially cut through bureaucratic road­
blocks to action).” 
In one of the rare independent case studies of the concept, Murekeyisoni 
(2017 ) finds positive effects in her assessment of deliverology applied to Ontario’s 
education reform in the McGuinty years. She found that deliverology facilitated 
efficient management and coordination while ensuring a citizen-centered, results-
based approach to educational reform. She further noted that it helped address re­
sistance to change in the delivery chain. However, this success refl ects adaptations 
of the deliverology model to engage actors collaboratively in defining goals and 
targets, rather than a standard top-down delivery pattern, and to grant fl exibility 
to actors to adapt to change.
Many negative criticisms situate deliverology as a variant of results-
based management and refer to research findings about the pitfalls of the ap­
plication of private-sector–inspired reforms with performance targets in the
public sector (Hood & Dixon, 2015a, 2015b; Manning, 2015). For example, de­
liverology is criticized for accentuating the hierarchical concentration of power 
within the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), to the detriment of accountability 
© 2019 CJPE 34.2, 303–328 doi: 10.3138/cjpe.53365 
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312 Birch and Jacob 
mechanisms such as institutionalized evaluation in the public service and report­
ing to Parliament. Top-down command-and-control approaches tend to demoti­
vate public-service workers by failing to recognize their existing expertise and by 
considering them as obstacles to policy reform rather than partners in delivery. 
Empirical work analyzing 20 agencies operating with performance contracts in 
Quebec revealed that better outcomes arose when decision-authority and fi nancial
controls were decentralized, not centralized (Aubert & Bourdeau, 2012), which is 
in keeping with Murekeysoni’s (2017) comments on the adaptations of deliverol­
ogy in Ontario. In contrast to Murekeysoni’s and Barber’s own claims about the 
effectiveness of deliverology for Ontario’s education reforms, Sattler (2012 ) found 
that these education-governance reforms were rooted in a neoliberal accountabili­
ty and performance reform agenda starting in 1990 that was implemented through 
a long-term, incremental, and “messy” process, with no evaluation of the ultimate 
impact on outcomes for students. Furthermore, some UK case studies also suggest a
continuum with pre-existing new public management reforms and expose the lim­
its to deliverology due to short-sighted targets, missed delivery problems, the com­
plexity of policy implementation, and the challenges of changing organizations 
and target population behaviors in durable ways (Smith, Richards, Geddes, &
Mathers, 2011; Smithers, 2001). 
A second line of criticism concerns the targets themselves, pressures to reach 
targets, and unintended, perverse, or short-lived effects. When targets lack legiti­
macy among practitioners, focus on a narrow set of metrics to the exclusion of 
others, and include mixed incentives attached to employee performance assess­
ment or to program funding, they can undermine results and outcomes, yielding 
perverse, unintended results by demotivating and devaluing practitioners, creat­
ing a climate of fear about the consequences of missing targets, and by placing 
them in ethical dilemmas (Arnaboldi, Lapsley, & Steccolini, 2015; Ayers, 2013; 
 Jacob, 2009a, 2009b;  Jacob, Miller-Pelletier, & Birch, 2017;  Murekeyisoni, 2017; 
Poister, 2003). By focusing on chosen metrics, deliverology may sacrifice the sys­
tematic analysis of unintended, even perverse consequences that will arise if ac­
tors down the delivery chain find incentives to “present selective data,” “game the 
metrics,” and “distort or manipulate the findings” (Bevan, 2012; Bevan & Hood, 
2006;  Fisher & Downes, 2008; Hood, 2006, 2010, 2012;  Schacter, 2002a, 2002b, 
2006, 2011, 2016;  Welsh & Ordóñez, 2014 ). The harshest and most sarcastic criti­
cism of deliverology comes from John  Seddon (2008, 2013), who argues using 
examples from deliverology under the Blair government that it is an oversimpli­
fied form of “Mickey Mouse command and control” that believes in “reform by 
targets” but misses the desired policy outcomes. He concludes that deliverology 
results in a dysfunctional, distorted system where demoralized, cynical service 
providers “manage all the wrong things,” by focusing on costs rather than values 
and on gaming targets rather than achieving higher outcomes, which leads to
increased costs to support gaming strategies, with perverse eff ects on outcomes
especially in the health-care and education sectors (see CFA Local 1983 [2010a, 
2010b] for videos of Seddon’s speeches condemning deliverology). To the extent 
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that deliverology is “old wine in a new bottle,” these problems with results-based 
approaches are relevant. 
Another consequence of results-based approaches is the trend toward using 
evaluation expertise in Canadian public administration to develop, track, and 
report on a limited set of metrics, which diminishes the time and resources al­
located to conducting all-encompassing evaluations that ensure accountability 
and learning for outcomes and do not just target achievements and reporting up
the internal hierarchy (Savoie, 2015). Politically driven and externally oriented 
accountability mechanisms embedded in performance regimes seem to miss the 
mark for measuring performance and for creating positive incentive systems for 
enchanced service delivery and policy learning, especially when policies entail 
complex tasks that are difficult to capture in a limited range of indicators (Jakob­
sen, Baekgaard, Moynihan, & van Loon, 2018). Already, without the addition
of deliverology, this narrow approach undermines the role and production of
ex post evaluations as a tool for policy learning and improving outcomes (Shep­
herd, 2018). When delivery units are created within departments in parallel with 
existing audit and evaluations departments, multiple tensions arise between the 
functions of delivery, auditing, and evaluation. Delivery units, because of their 
direct links to the PCO and their preoccupation with results indicators, further 
institutionalize a form of new political governance that may squeeze audit and 
evaluation functions. For civil servants, ethical tensions can emerge between the 
public-sector ethos of neutrality and the perceived partisan prerogatives of deliv­
ery units, especially when the line between public service in the government and 
public service under the governing party becomes fuzzy. 
Furthermore, deliverology targets are more limited in range and depth than 
the indicators of program relevance, effectiveness, and outcomes that evaluators
would choose or that may be meaningful to citizens. When deliverology targets 
are met while other more significant indicators are not, this may actually under­
mine legitimacy, as citizens perceive a gap between the successful attainment of 
a target and their own experiences as the beneficiaries of a public service. When 
the broader range of evaluation criteria and indicators is ignored, it is likely to
take more time and be more tedious to improve delivery, benefi ciary satisfaction, 
and desired long-term outcomes. Although command-and-control approaches to
delivery may yield short-term results, long-term change requires modifi cations in 
organizational culture and behaviour. This may stall as the next election nears be­
cause the delivery concerns of politicians metamorphose into a focus on the cam­
paign ahead, and those of civil servants anticipate those of the next government. 
Although Barber recognizes the growing criticism of the eff ectiveness of
delivery units, given their variable results, his response is as follows: 
 This critique is important, but is not completely fair, as the idea of a Delivery Unit has 
become a victim of its own success. When something is fashionable, lots of people 
rush to do it, and so impact inevitably varies. As a result, many Delivery Units have
the label, but not much else. They belong to a large and growing group of “DINOs”— 
Delivery Units in Name Only. (Delivery Associates, n.d.b) 
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A third line of criticism tackles the question of the value-added of deliverol­
ogy from the perspective of the practitioners of public policy, management, and 
evaluation as well as of scholars and students of public policy and management. 
Essentially, deliverology just repackages old ideas, especially but not exclusively 
about performance management. Many of these ideas, which are standard fare in 
introductory “101” courses on public policy, administration, or project manage­
ment, are portrayed as innovative ones by advocates of deliverology. Th is repack­
aging is well illustrated in two reports by the Centre for Public Impact, which is 
co-chaired by Michael Barber, namely “The Public Impact Fundamentals Report: 
Helping Governments Progress from Idea to Impact”  (2016 ) and “A Rubric for 
Assessing Public Impact: Applying the Public Fundamentals to the Real World” 
 (2017 ). These reports present a self-proclaimed “new maximization framework” 
to close the gap between what governments achieve for their citizens and what 
they could deliver, a “checklist for practitioners” based on the three public funda­
mentals (legitimacy, policy, and action), and a rubric for determining what sourc­
es of information (such as organization publications, initiative blueprint, initiative
implementation plan, speeches from politicians, party manifestos, and public
opinion research, plus articles, case studies, and reports) are needed to evaluate 
the fundamentals. The promotion of these simple, repackaged frameworks and 
checklists as “new” to professionals who have been applying them and more for 
some time in their departments errs by ignoring their pre-existing knowledge and 
expertise. This can foster cynicism and demotivation rather than enthusiasm for 
the government’s reform agenda. This is more likely when civil servants perceive
delivery units as restructuring the space for policy conversations and the roles of 
existing internal accountability units to their disadvantage or perceive new con­
flicts between goals, short-sighted targets, and outcomes. Furthermore, according 
to Jakobsen et al. (2018 ), external accountability regimes (of which deliverology 
is one) that are not grounded scientifically and empirically tend to “crowd out,” 
rather than stimulate, the intrinsic motivation of service providers because of mis­
matched external incentives and performance indicators, weak consideration of
the complexity of policy tasks, and implicit disregard of the importance of intrin­
sically motivated, autonomous professionals in service management and delivery. 
Finally, one may ask whether the “old wine in new bottles” remains, nonethe­
less, of timeless relevancy or is past its expiry date. This is a question that those 
who have been promoting the deliverology model relentlessly since the Blair years 
do not seem to entertain. By contrast, this is the quintessential question for evalu­
ators, public administration scholars, and political scientists. Th eir theoretical
reflections, empirical research, and practitioner experiences regarding results-
based management, its organizational and whole-of-government impact, and its 
relationship to evaluation have supported a trend favoring “new wine in new bot­
tles.” This trend goes beyond earlier, simplified, top-down approaches to results-
based management to recognize the importance of dialogues between those who 
make the policy decisions and those who assure implementation. Th ese dialogues 
involve conversations between agents and principals about performance, the
© 2019 CJPE 34.2, 303–328 doi: 10.3138/cjpe.53365 
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interface between performance management and evaluation, designing perfor­
mance systems to encourage organizational learning and effectiveness, policy task 
complexity, the appropriate indicators, employee motivation, incentive mecha­
nisms as an antidote to cynicism, and the optimal conditions for policy as well 
as organizational learning (e.g., Jakobsen et al., 2018; Laihonen & Mäntylä, 2017; 
Moynihan, 2005, 2008a, 2008b, 2010). 
WHAT ABOUT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
DELIVEROLOGY IN CANADA?
Deliverology, like any public management reform, is never implemented in a vac­
uum. For this reason, let us begin by establishing the context in which it came to
Canada through a brief review of historical developments in Canadian public policy
and administration. From the 1970s onward, Canada began experimenting with
results-based approaches. The country undertook yet another initiative4 on “re­
thinking government” in the mid-1990s and implemented routines for evaluation,
results-based management, regulatory impact assessment, citizen engagement and
consultation, stakeholder participation, the production and use of public opinion
research, evaluation, and scientific evidence in policy. Although some of these 
routines were under pressure during the Harper years, they did not disappear from
the public-sector landscape. Rather, the Canadian state honed and fi ne-tuned the
infrastructure for monitoring and evaluation and the requirements for the utiliza­
tion of evaluation results that were instituted with the Treasury Board’s Results for
Canadians in 2000 and reinforced with mandatory performance frameworks at the
program and organizational levels (Lahey, 2017; Lahey & Nielsen, 2013: Shepherd,
2018). Since 2013, long before deliverology and the mandate letter tracker, the 
Treasury Board already published online the GC InfoBase, which tracks a variety of
indicators and government results (Canada, Treasury Board Secretariat, n.d.). Th e 
2009 Evaluation Policy (Canada, Treasury Board Secretariat, 2009) that was replaced
by the Policy on Results (Canada, Treasury Board Secretariat, 2010) already talked
about producing timely, neutral evaluation evidence and managing for results.
In many ways, Canadian public servants have been working within results-
based management and accountability frameworks since the 1970s, long before 
the Trudeau government contracted Barber’s services (Curran, 2016; Lahey, 2017; 
Lahey & Nielsen, 2013; Tweedie, 2018). In fact, Tweedie (2018 ) asserts, 
We are open, accountable, and transparent. We use plain language and consult with
our stakeholders. We have strategic plans, operational plans and implementation
plans. We use SMART indicators and ensure that relevance and performance (value 
for money) drive our organisations to deliver results of benefit to Canadians. We do 
risk assessments, audits, and evaluations according to clear, published criteria. Mod­
ern public policy governance? Nailed it. 
However, both Tweedie (2018 ) and Savoie (2015) point out that the Auditor Gen­
eral of Canada remains critical of public services where the implementation of the 
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316 Birch and Jacob 
results-based approach resulted in agencies focusing on internal accountability 
chains, thus neglecting the citizens’ perspective and the unintended consequences 
of the policy in their performance reports (Auditor General of Canada, 2002, 
2004, 2005, 2017). Lahey and Nielsen (2013 ) also note that the Auditor General 
supports monitoring and evaluation practices and uptake and frequently calls 
for more substantive evaluation of overall program effectiveness and quality of
results. They also recognize the persistent diffi  culties the Canadian system ex­
periences in “establishing the right balance” (p. 49) between using performance 
measurement from monitoring and evaluation for accountability versus policy 
learning. Given this historical backdrop, deliverology, with its focus on deliver­
ing the governing party’s agenda and on defining success in terms of reaching
targets, may well exacerbate these difficulties by reinforcing this pre-existing trend 
to favour performance measurement use for control rather than for improving 
operations through policy learning. Let us now turn to the implementation of
deliverology in Canada at the federal level. 
On December 23, 2015, Prime Minister Trudeau named Matthew Mendel­
sohn, former advisor and deputy minister in Ontario’s McGuinty government, as 
Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet (Results and Delivery) in the Privy Council Offi  ce.
At the first Liberal cabinet retreat in St. Andrews, New Brunswick, in January 2016,
deliverology officially appeared on the federal political landscape (Dyer, 2016a). Sir
Michael Barber from Delivery Associates, under contract for two years at $217,000
(Castonguay, 2016), Dominic Barton, CEO from McKinsey Consulting, working 
pro bono (Geddes, 2016), and their ideas became special guests at this meeting and
at subsequent federal cabinet retreats in Kananaskis, Alberta (April 2016), Sudbury,
Ontario (August 2016), St. John’s, Newfoundland and Labrador (September 2017), 
and London, Ontario (January 2018). Through the Results and Delivery Unit in 
the Privy Council Office, Barber’s ideas became embedded in the Trudeau govern­
ment, which created a cabinet committee on “Agenda and Results,” chaired by the 
Prime Minister, which would become the “Agenda, Results and Communication”
committee by August 2016 (Wells, 2016b) and subsume the cabinet committee on
open government and parliamentary affairs in August 2018. The Canada School of
Public Service offered videos featuring Barber (Canada School of Public Service,
2016a, 2016b), and the Institute on Governance (2018 ) offered training packages 
on deliverology. The Trudeau government deployed considerable effort at the
apex of power to show a commitment to effect a deliverology culture shift  from
the top of the Canadian government down the delivery chains. 
By July 1, 2016, the government had introduced the  Policy on Results and the 
Directive on Results to replace the Policy on Reporting of Federal Institutions and 
Corporate Interests to Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat (2007 ), the  Policy on
Evaluation ( 2009 ), and the  Policy on Management, Resources and Results Struc­
tures ( 2010 ) (Canada, Treasury Board Secretariat, 2016a, 2016b). Under the new 
policy, the evaluation function remains embedded in the Canadian state, with 
some new requirements. Th e Policy on Results explicitly links evaluation with per­
formance measurement semantically and structurally through the Performance 
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Measurement and Evaluation Committee. Departments began creating new posi­
tions for a Chief Results and Delivery Officer and a Chief Data Offi  cer.
 Then, in November 2017, the Trudeau government launched the ultimate 
deliverology tool: the Mandate Letter Tracker (Canada, Privy Council Offi  ce,
2018a, 2018b; MacCharles, 2017). In January 2018, Matthew Mendelsohn, head 
of Canada’s delivery unit, presented deliverology as a “data-driven, results-focused 
approach” to public-sector management that included a space for evidence and 
evaluation, despite the challenges of “obtaining timely data for metrics on pledge
fulfillment” (Mendelsohn, as interviewed by Haws, 2018). He seems to suggest 
that the value-added of the Mandate Tracker is to provide greater transparency 
about pledge tracking, a task that previous governments did behind closed doors, 
and to focus executive-level attention on implementation through “ongoing evalu­
ation” as opposed to conventional ex post evaluations. In contrast, political scien­
tists express serious concerns that deliverology encourages deeper centralization 
at the executive level with special communication channels and additional re­
sources for delivery units (Alex Marland and Anna Esselment, as interviewed by 
Ryckewaert, 2016). 
From the start, the Canadian media responded to these developments in 
federal governance with skepticism, calling Barber a “guru” (Arellano, 2016c; 
Dyer, 2016b; McGregor, 2016), the Prime Minister a “devotee” (Wherry, 2016), 
and deliverology as the latest “fad and fashion” (French, 2016) or a “punchline”
(Radwanski, 2017), with growing criticism (Wherry, 2017) that switched to sar­
casm when denied an interview with Barber on broken election promises and the 
use of “deliverology for relentless implementation” (Bimman, 2018). Responding 
to an article in  L’Actualité (Castonguay, 2016), the Canadian Evaluation Society 
reminded readers of the 40 years of evaluation practice in Canada and the insti­
tutionalization of evaluation in the federal administration starting in 1977 (Cum­
mings & Gauthier, 2016). At a press conference to release fall reports, Michael 
Ferguson, the Auditor General of Canada (2017 ), signalled that there is a delivery 
gap between the whole-of-government level and its messages about citizen-centric 
service delivery. When queried about the mandate tracker, Ferguson remarked 
that the limited scope of the mandate tracker with its focus on election promises 
missed the fact that “there’s more to government than big-talk mandate letters 
for ministers” (as cited by Delacourt, 2017). In many ways, the “Mandate Letter 
Tracker” website seems to be a new tool for political communications and packag­
ing the government’s progress (or lack of progress) toward achieving its election 
commitments as reformulated and adjusted in the mandate letters.5
 The arrival of deliverology in Canada sparked a friendly debate between
Mark  Schacter (2016 ), an Ottawa-based consultant and author of a critical essay 
entitled “Does ‘Deliverology’ Matter?,” and Steve  Montague (2016 ), an adjunct 
professor and consultant who offered “A Response to Does ‘Deliverology’ Mat­
ter?: Targets Can Work If Done Properly.” Although Montague recognized many
of Schacter’s criticisms, he expressed reservations about skepticism toward tar­
gets. He argued for the  “ responsible” development and management of targets 
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318 Birch and Jacob 
over the longer policy cycle in an iterative process that engages stakeholders and 
decision makers and contributes to policy learning. Th us, Montague implicitly
embraced the “new wine” approach based on performance dialogues for learning
and explicitly hoped that the Canadian brand of deliverology would engage in 
“ responsible” targeting.
 CONCLUSION
 This tale of two worlds traces the portrait of deliverology as a business and a model 
of implementation that repackages and rebrands old ideas linked to results-based 
management and democratic accountability as pledge fulfillment, while assuming
that current governance systems are not delivering and therefore need a deliverol­
ogy fix. It questions the innovativeness of deliverology generally and highlights 
some criticisms of this model, especially regarding the possibility that deliverol­
ogy may usurp evaluative capacity. It finds limited value-added, since recourse to 
deliverology in Canada ignores both the strong record of pledge fulfi llment and 
the particularities of Canada’s complex multi-level governance context. Although 
deliverology does bring a focus on implementation to the apex of power, its
relevance and effectiveness seem somewhat elusive in a context where the state 
has already institutionalized evaluation and results-based approaches and where 
new political governance undermines frontline delivery capacity via the inverted 
“90/10” split. Th e effectiveness of deliverology as a “way to run a government” 
has never been subjected to an independent, whole-of-government evaluation, 
and, if it were, it would be difficult to disentangle outcomes owing to deliverol­
ogy from those owing to other factors in a context of institutionalized evaluation 
and monitoring systems. Originally a “tongue-in-cheek” term coined by Barber’s 
critics (The Economist, 2015), deliverology became Barber’s globalized consulting
enterprise. Barber’s deliverology has an aura of scientificity because of recourse 
to target metrics, and an appealing message because of its practical, business-like 
approach to complex governance challenges associated with public sector reforms.
Deliverology is light on science and heavy on narrative, with fl exible evidence 
standards that favour “best practice stories” and narrower “targeted metrics,”
whereas evaluation and social research are science heavy and narrative light, with 
stricter evidence standards, assessment criteria, and multiple metric points tai­
lored to specific purposes. Each world has its own value orientation. Barber relies 
on business-inspired thinking about running a government that inherently values 
private-sector performance management. His model is shaped by the ideological 
orientations of the self-proclaimed, “small ‘l’ liberal” and “centre-right” think 
tanks and organizations that Barber refers to in his works.  By contrast, evalua­
tors and policy researchers are grounded in scientific thinking, leading them to 
value systematic recourse to theories, research methods, and empirical fi ndings 
to address policy questions, to assess implementation outcomes, and to determine 
the effects of programs and policies, as compared to the “counterfactual”—that 
is, what would have occurred had the policy or program not been implemented, 
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or if they had been implemented diff erently. To them, many of Barber’s sources 
are “grey literature.” To Barber, the work of evaluators and policy scientists is 
too abstract and lacks synthesis. He cares about helping governments to deliver 
their election promises and reforms, whatever they may be, abstracted from any 
critical analysis of the reform agenda itself, the need for structural change within 
the public administration system, or the current pledge-delivery capacity of the 
system. By contrast, evaluators and political scientists care about the relevancy, 
appropriateness, and impact of such reforms—that is, their ability to achieve
socially desirable outcomes with target populations in meaningful, cost-eff ective
ways, and their ability to enhance public management and service delivery. Where 
evaluators aspire to facilitate conversations about “good” commitments and out­
come congruence with policy goals, “deliverologists” assume party commitments 
are “good” and seek conversations about implementation and progress toward 
achieving set targets.
Perhaps Barber can learn from evaluators, public administration scholars, 
and political scientists about the importance of context, evidence of the perverse 
effects of governance by targets, evidence of the failures of private-sector–inspired
reforms on public-sector capacity and employee motivation, and, most important, 
the role of more comprehensive evaluations of reforms, programs, and policies 
in deep policy learning and delivery of better outcomes. If nothing else, perhaps 
evaluators, public administration scholars, and political scientists should take
note of the importance of “storytelling” and “packaging” as a mode of knowledge 
diffusion for uptake by policymakers. Barber’s success in global networking to 
diffuse his “Deliverology®” model shows that storytelling about the eff ectiveness
of this governance model, even without solid, science-based evidence, is more
appealing to policymakers who say they support “evidence-informed” policy and 
management but who struggle with bounded rationality in complex, challenging 
policy environments.
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 NOTES
1	 Savoie (2015) asserts that “To those inside, particularly where it matters increasingly in 
central agencies and in the Prime Minister’s Offi  ce (PMO), government is 90 per cent 
ideas and 10 per cent implementation. To those outside, government should be 90 per 
cent implementation and 10 percent ideas…. There is a fault line in government that sep­
arates those responsible for generating new policies and managing the blame game from
those responsible for implementation. That explains why government was not as good as 
it once was in delivering programs and services” (pp. 14–15). Like Savoie, Michael Barber
(2016, p. 36) advises politicians that “policy is 10 per cent and implementation is 90 per 
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320 Birch and Jacob 
cent.” Oddly, neither Savoie nor Barber references the other’s work, nor do they reference
similar literature, despite their shared diagnostic of the 90/10 split and their criticism of
the short-sightedness of “government by political communications.” 
2	 The exception is a reference to Osbourne and Gaebler’s famous book  Reinventing Gov­
ernment: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit Is Transforming the Public Sector (1993), which 
emphasizes market-oriented, results-oriented governments that “steer” rather than “row.”
3	 We began our research eff orts and analysis of “deliverology” in 2016 at the same time 
as others (see Richards, 2018; Richards et al., 2017; Schacter, 2016). Our fi ndings cor­
roborate one another’s. We add that much of the positive literature on “deliverology” in 
cyberspace is linked to Barber or to one of the consulting firms with which he is or was 
associated. 
4	 Since the Glassco commission of 1962–63, the Canadian government has experienced 
multiple iterative processes that have led to the institutionalization of evaluation and 
shifts toward evidence-based decision making. 
5 	Governing parties in Canada have used similar tools to track their promise delivery, 
without calling it “deliverology.” See the Campbell government’s “Five Great Goals for 
a Golden Decade” in B.C., the Stelmach government’s “Measuring Up: Progress Report
on the Business Plan of the Alberta Government,” the Charest government’s short-lived 
tracking tool or the traffic light system of the Marois government in Quebec, and the 
federal government’s “Departmental Results Framework and Inventory Program.” 
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